讲座题目：防止信息泄露的亚博斗地主提现_亚博体育下载地址_狗亚是亚博还是亚游契约研究（Supply Chain Contracts that Prevent Information Leakage）
主讲人：Dr. Yiwei Chen（陈祎伟博士），Singapore University of Technology and Design
This paper determines categories of contracts that facilitate vertical information sharing in a supply chain while precluding horizontal information leakage among competing newsvendors. We consider a supply chain in which retailers replenish inventory from a common supplier to satisfy uncertain demand and are engaged in newsvendor competition. Each retailer has imperfect demand information. Yet, one of the retailers (the incumbent) has a more accurate demand forecast than the other (the entrant). Information leakage among such competing retailers precludes vertical information sharing and is often the reason for many retailers to abandon collaborative forecast sharing initiatives, leading to sub-optimized supply chains. We show that whether a contract can prevent information leakage depends on how the inventory risk (i.e., cost of supply-demand mismatch) is distributed between the supplier and retailers in conjunction with the allocation of financial flows (i.e., sharing of pro ts). These results help us categorize contracts based on how they allocate inventory risk among firms when compared with a wholesale price contract. This comparison yields four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories of contracts. A downside-protection contract is one that effectively reduces retailers cost of excess inventory by shifting some of their overage cost to the supplier. Examples of such contracts include buy-back and revenue-sharing contracts. An upside-protection contract is one that effectively increases retailers cost of inventory shortage by shifting some of the suppliers underage cost to retailers. Examples of such contracts include penalty and rebate contracts. A two-sided protection contract combines the properties of the previous two categories. A no-protection contract is one that fails to shift firms cost of inventory shortage or excess from one to the other. Examples of such contracts include wholesale-price and two-part tariff contracts. We show that no-protection contracts, which are extensively used in practice, cannot prevent information leakage whereas downside, upside or two-sided protection contracts may do so. We show how much each retailer needs to optimally order in such a competitive market and quantify the resulting supply chain profits and channel efficiency. We show that preventing information leakage could be costly for the supply chain (e.g., low channel efficiency). We also show how our unied framework to study variety of contracts can enable a firm to find and select the best performing contract (among many) that precludes information leakage while almost coordinating the channel. For example, buy-back contracts perform significantly better than revenue-sharing or rebate contracts.
Dr. Yiwei Chen is an Assistant Professor at Singapore University of Technology and Design, Pillar of Engineering Systems and Design. He will be joining the University of Cincinnati, College of Business as an Assistant Professor in August 2018. Dr. Chen received his Ph.D. from MIT Sloan School of Management. His primary research interests are revenue management and pricing, and sharing economy and innovative marketplaces. His papers have been published at Management Science, Mathematics of Operations Research, Operations Research, Production and Operations Management, Transportation Research Part B: Methodological.
陈祎伟博士现为新加坡科技设计大学助理教授；他于2012年获得美国麻省理工学院（MIT）斯隆管理学院运营管理学博士学位，并辅修经济与金融学。陈祎伟博士2008-2012年在麻省理工学院任研究助理，并先后从美国斯坦福大学和北京大学获得电气工程硕士学位及物理学学士学位。陈祎伟博士于2010年5-12月间，在IBM沃森研究中心（IBM Watson Research Center, Yorktown, NY, USA）担任实习研究员，在此期间发明了消费品需求预测和价格预测工具，并将此工具应用到实际工业系统中。主要集中在运营管理、经济学与金融等。陈祎伟博士的个人主页